Modeling and Reasoning about an Attacker with Cryptanalytical Capabilities  by Montalto, Bruno & Caleiro, Carlos
Modeling and Reasoning about an Attacker
with Cryptanalytical Capabilities
Bruno Montalto1,2
Department of Computer Science
Information Security Group
ETH Zu¨rich, Switzerland
and
SQIG - Instituto de Telecomunicac¸o˜es
Department of Mathematics, IST
TU Lisbon, Portugal
Carlos Caleiro 1,3
SQIG - Instituto de Telecomunicac¸o˜es
Department of Mathematics, IST
TU Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract
We propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed framework
allows one to model and reason about attackers that extend the usual Dolev-Yao adversary with explicit
probabilistic statements representing properties of cryptographic primitives and the attacker’s (partial)
information about secret messages. The expressive power of these probabilistic statements is illustrated,
namely by representing a standard security notion like indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks.
We present an entropy-based approach to estimate the probability of a successful attack on a protocol given
the prescribed knowledge of the attacker. We prove that, for an attacker whose knowledge increases with
the security parameter, computing this quantity is NP-hard in the security parameter. However, we are still
able to analyze a few meaningful and illustrative examples. Finally, we obtain a result which may be used
to prove that a certain amount of probabilistic knowledge (about the properties of the cryptography being
used) is not enough for allowing an attacker to correctly uncover a secret with non-negligible probability.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of security protocols has been the subject of much research in the last
few decades. Two fundamentally distinct approaches have been used to this end.
In the symbolic approach, introduced in the early 1980’s by Dolev and Yao [14],
messages are represented as terms and technical details of cryptographic primitives
are ignored. These models adopt the perfect cryptography assumption. For ex-
ample, encryption is viewed as a black-box operation, so that, from an encrypted
message, the attacker may not obtain any partial knowledge about the original
message. Such symbolic methods have been widely accepted among the scientiﬁc
community, and several tools for automated analysis of security protocols (mostly
attack-search engines) have been developed based on this approach [5,10,13]. In
fact, one of the main reasons for the popularity of this approach is that such strong
abstractions allow automated proofs of the security of protocols. Their main weak-
ness, however, is that it is hard to prove that these abstractions are sound, since in
practice cryptographic primitives have properties which the attacker may explore
and attack: for example, the redundancy of certain messages may be explored by
the attacker to guess a weak password [8].
In stark contrast with the formal approach is the computational one. Compu-
tational methods use a more complex framework, in which messages are treated
as actual bitstrings and cryptographic primitives as functions acting on those bit-
strings. In order to provide a more complete and realistic representation of a “real”
attacker, the computational approach deals with concepts like complexity and prob-
ability [20,25]. Security proofs in the computational approach are generally stronger
than in the formal approach, since they allow the attacker to explore vulnerabilities
of the cryptographic primitives to ﬁnd a suitable attack. However, the greater com-
plexity of these methods makes it diﬃcult to obtain such proofs in an automated
way, and it is hard to analyze even simple protocols in this setting.
In recent years, there has been a considerable eﬀort in bridging the gap be-
tween these two approaches [1,6,7,16,27]. Our work aims precisely at this task. We
present a formal model featuring an attacker who is allowed to take advantage of
partial probabilistic information about the messages exchanged in the execution of
a protocol by exploring certain cryptographic properties. This information is repre-
sented in the form of probabilistic statements about secret messages seen as random
variables. We assume any suitable underlying communication model representing
a Dolev-Yao adversary, such as in [3]. For the sake of space, we do not dwell here
on the details of any particular symbolic model, although we have reported on it
in [23]. We also present a way to estimate the probability of success of an attack
based on the probabilistic statements that are known by the attacker. Estimating
this quantity is useful not only because it provides a quantitative measure of the
security of a protocol, but also because it allows us to evaluate the security impact
of certain cryptographic weaknesses. In fact, our model is based not on the speciﬁc
details of the cryptographic primitives but rather on probabilistic statements about
their properties and the partial information about secret messages that the attacker
may uncover. Thus, by describing general cryptographic properties, we may use
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our model to assess their impact on the security of a protocol.
The presentation is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our set-
ting. Namely, we deﬁne how we represent messages in our framework and describe
the capabilities of the attacker. We deﬁne the syntax of the probabilistic state-
ments considered in our model and present some examples which illustrate what
these statements may represent, including cryptographic properties. In particular,
we prove a theorem which shows how IND-CPA (indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks) security, a standard property for asymmetric encryption schemes,
may be translated to our framework. Section 3 concerns the estimation of proba-
bilities based on the set of probabilistic statements available to the attacker. We
interpret messages as random variables whose range (the set of values which they
may assume) is a set of bitstrings. To this end we use Shannon’s notion of entropy.
We present some examples which illustrate these ideas and methods, and obtain
a theorem which may be useful in proving that the partial knowledge (about the
properties of the cryptography being used) of an attacker is not enough for correctly
guessing a secret with non-negligible probability. In Section 4 we assess our work
and present some questions for further research. We include an Appendix with
detailed proofs and examples.
2 The framework
We consider a public network where principals exchange private messages. To pre-
vent an attacker from breaking the security of the network, the principals use secu-
rity protocols. These protocols specify how the principals construct the messages
that they publish using cryptographic functions. In our framework, each message
corresponds to a bitstring. We represent the set of bitstrings by B = {0, 1}∗. We
use elements of B to encode numbers and ﬁnite sequences of bitstrings 4 . To repre-
sent the functions used by the principals to manipulate messages and execute the
protocols, we use a ﬁnite set F of deterministic algorithms and another ﬁnite set R
of probabilistic algorithms. Note that it is possible to simulate the execution of a
general probabilistic algorithm by means of a deterministic algorithm and a proba-
bilistic algorithm which represents the randomness involved in the calculations and
depends only on the security parameter. For this reason, we will assume (without
loss of generality) that all algorithms in R receive only the security parameter as
input, and will dub them random generation algorithms.
Since we want to model an attacker A with additional cryptanalytical capabili-
ties, we consider additional ﬁnite sets of deterministic algorithms, FA ⊇ F , and
random generation algorithms, RA ⊇ R, which A may use to obtain and represent
knowledge about the secret data involved in the protocols or to compose messages of
his own. For the sake of reasoning about complexity issues and ultimately modeling
and reasoning about computationally feasible attacks exploring cryptanalysis, we
consider that each algorithm depends on a security parameter. We will be interested
4 Recall that there are bijections between B and Z and between B and B∗ which may be eﬃciently
computed and inverted.
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in modeling an attacker with limited computational power, i.e., an attacker who can
only perform a number of operations limited by a function (usually a polynomial)
of the security parameter.
The next deﬁnition introduces the set of valid expressions for given sets F ,R of
algorithms. We will denote this set by Exp(F ,R). These expressions represent the
construction of a message by applying deterministic algorithms to bitstrings (either
randomly generated or chosen by the principals).
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let F be a ﬁnite set of deterministic algorithms and R a ﬁnite set
of random generation algorithms. The set Exp(F ,R) of expressions generated by
the sets F ,R is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• for each j ∈ N and R ∈ R, Rj ∈ Exp(F ,R);
• B ⊆ Exp(F ,R);
• if E1, . . . , En ∈ Exp(F ,R) and F ∈ F , F (E1, . . . , En) ∈ Exp(F ,R).
When the sets F ,R of public algorithms and FA,RA of algorithms available to
an attacker A are clear from the context, we abbreviate Exp = Exp(F ,R), ExpA =
Exp(FA,RA). Intuitively, each expression in Exp (resp. ExpA) represents the
construction of a message using public algorithms (resp. the algorithms available
to the attacker A). Each random generation algorithm R ∈ RA may be executed
several times. Since each of these executions may output a diﬀerent bitstring,
we need to distinguish between them. Thus, for each j ∈ N, the expression Rj
represents a diﬀerent execution of the random generation algorithm R.
We now introduce some useful notation. Consider an attacker A with limited
computational power (i.e., for each security parameter η, A may only perform a
ﬁnite number of operations f(η)). It is easy to see that, for each η, A can only
interpret and obtain information from expressions with at most a ﬁnite size. Thus,
when modeling A, the set of expressions which need to be considered is ﬁnite; for
instance, one may only consider expressions with up to f(η) subexpressions 5 . Let
us denote that set by ExpAη ⊆ ExpA. For similar reasons, we may assume that the
set of bitstrings which an expression in ExpAη may possibly represent is also a ﬁnite
set BAη ⊆ B. For each η, we deﬁne the set
ΩAη = {f | f : ExpAη \B→ BAη }.
We use the superscript A to highlight the fact that this set depends on the algo-
rithms and bitstrings available to A. An element of ΩAη associates each expression
in ExpAη \B to a bitstring in BAη - thus, a probability distribution on ΩAη completely
determines the probability distribution of all random variables represented by ex-
pressions, as well as dependencies between them. For example, for E,E′ ∈ ExpAη ,
5 Note also that we need to assume a ﬁnite set of expressions of the form Ri for each algorithm R ∈ RA;
we namely require that i < f(η).
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b, b′ ∈ BAη ,
P [E = b | E′ = b′] = P [{f ∈ Exp
A
η | f(E) = b, f(E′) = b′}]
P [{f ∈ ExpAη | f(E′) = b′}]
.
We will denote by DAη the probability distribution induced on ΩAη by the algorithms
in FA and RA. If E ∈ ExpAη , we write Eη for the random variable representing the
bitstring obtained by constructing a message in the way prescribed by E and using
security parameter η in the computations. If D is any probability distribution on ΩAη
and {E1, . . . , En} ⊆ ExpAη , we will write En, . . . , En ← D to denote that the n-tuple
of random variables (E1, . . . , En) has the probability distribution determined by D.
In particular, if D = DAη and E1, . . . , En ← D, then (E1, . . . , En) ∼ (E1η , . . . , Enη )
(i.e., both vectors have the same joint probability distribution). We will omit the
security parameter η when it is clear from the context or is not relevant to the
discussion.
We may now introduce our notion of probabilistic statement.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A probabilistic statement is a statement of the form
P [E1η = b1, . . . , E
n
η = bn | E∗,1η = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
η = b
∗
n∗ ] = ρ,
where η ∈ N is a security parameter, E1, . . . , En, E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ∈ ExpAη , b1, . . . , bn,
b∗1, . . . , b∗n∗ ∈ BAη , and ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Such probabilistic statements model cryptographic properties written as proba-
bilistic relations between expressions. This means that, by knowing the bitstrings
corresponding to certain expressions, the attacker is able to learn “something” about
the probability distribution of the bitstrings corresponding to other expressions.
If η ∈ N, E1, . . . , En, E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ∈ ExpAη , b1, . . . , bn, b∗1, . . . , b∗n∗ ∈ BAη and
ρ ∈ [0, 1], we will say that
P [E1 = b1, . . . , En = bn | E∗,1 = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
= b∗n∗ ] = ρ
is veriﬁed by a probability distribution D on ΩAη if the equality holds when
E1, . . . , En, E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ← D.
We now present some simple properties of cryptographic primitives which may
be represented by probabilistic statements.
Example 2.3 One of the simplest and most important properties one may think of
is that decryption with a private key is the “inverse” operation of encryption with
the corresponding public key. To represent this, consider a probabilistic asymmetric
encryption scheme (Rk, pub, priv, Re,Enc,Dec), where:
• Rk ∈ R is the key generation algorithm;
• pub, priv ∈ F are deterministic algorithms such that pub(Rik) (resp. priv(Rik))
returns the public (resp. private) key corresponding to Rik;
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• Re ∈ R is a random generation algorithm representing the randomness involved
in the (probabilistic) encryption;
• Enc, Dec ∈ F are the encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively.
The encryption of a message represented by the expression E using a public key
pub(Rik) and random data R
j
e is represented by the expression Enc(E, pub(Rik), R
j
e),
and the decryption of E using the private key priv(Rik) is represented by
Dec(E, priv(Rik)), where R
i
k, R
j
e respectively represent a randomly generated key
and random data used in the encryption. Thus, if the encryption/decryption algo-
rithms are correct, the following probabilistic statements are valid:
P [Dec(Enc(E, pub(Rik), R
j
e), priv(R
i
k)) = b | E = b] = 1,
P [E = b | Dec(Enc(E, pub(Rik), Rje), priv(Rik)) = b] = 1.
Example 2.4 Let (Rk, pub, priv, Re,Enc,Dec) be the Elgamal encryption scheme.
In this encryption scheme, messages are represented by elements of a group. Thus,
we may consider an additional deterministic algorithm mult ∈ FA such that
mult(E1, E2) represents the multiplication of the two messages corresponding to
E1 and E2. The well-known malleability property of Elgamal can be represented
by the following pair of properties.
P [mult(E1,Enc(E2, pub(Rik), R
j
e)) = b | Enc(mult(E1, E2), pub(Rik), Rje) = b] = 1,
P [Enc(mult(E1, E2), pub(Rik), R
j
e) = b | mult(E1,Enc(E2, pub(Rik), Rje)) = b] = 1.
Example 2.5 Many encryption functions reveal some information about the length
of the underlying plaintext. Suppose that an encryption scheme is such that
“If the length of a ciphertext is l, then there is a 0.5 probability that the length
of the underlying plaintext is also l.”
This may be represented by the cryptographic property
P [length(E) = l | length(Enc(E, pub(Rik), Rje)) = l] = 0.5,
where length ∈ FA is an algorithm which returns a bitstring representing the length
of the bitstring corresponding to a given expression and l is a bitstring representing
an integer.
Other examples of probabilistic statements may be found in Example 3.7 and
Example 3.9; their discussions are given in the Appendix.
We now show how to represent the notion of IND-CPA (indistinguishability
under chosen plaintext attacks) security for asymmetric encryption schemes using
the notion of probabilistic statements as deﬁned above. Recall that a function
f : N → R is negligible if, for every c > 0, there exists n ∈ N such that k > n ⇒
f(k) ≤ k−c.
In the IND-CPA experiment, a polynomial-time attacker queries a certain oracle
with pairs of plaintexts. The oracle either always returns an encryption of the
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ﬁrst message, or always returns an encryption of the second message; the goal of
the attacker is to ﬁnd which. The intuition behind IND-CPA security is that,
for a polynomial-time observer, the encryption function reveals nothing about the
underlying plaintext. A precise deﬁnition follows.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let E = (Rk, pub, priv, Re,Enc,Dec) be an asymmetric encryption
scheme. Consider the following experiment:
• a security parameter η is ﬁxed
• a random key R1k is generated by running Rk(η)
• the corresponding public key pub(R1k) is computed and published
• a random bit R1b is chosen using a random generation algorithm Rb; the value of
b remains secret
• a probabilistic algorithm Alg receives as input a security parameter η and the
public key pub(R1k), and returns 0 or 1. Alg may use an oracle O such that, for
any valid plaintexts m1,m2,
O(m1,m2) = Enc(mb, pub(R1k), Rie),
where a diﬀerent Rie is sampled from Re(η) each time the oracle is called.
We say that E is IND-CPA secure if, for any such polynomial-time algorithm
Alg,
P [Alg(pub(R1k) = 1 | R1b = 1]− P [Alg(pub(R1k)) = 1 | R1b = 0] (1)
is negligible as a function of η. We will also say that an algorithm Alg compromises
the IND-CPA security of E if (1) is not negligible for Alg.
The next theorem describes this intuition in a rigorous (if a little involved) way.
It expresses IND-CPA security in terms of probabilistic statements by using the
well-known fact that an asymmetric encryption scheme is not IND-CPA secure iﬀ
an attacker can compromise its IND-CPA security by performing only one query to
the oracle. The resulted is stated using the same notational conventions as above.
Theorem 2.7 The following are equivalent:
(1) E is not IND-CPA secure.
(2) There exist deterministic polynomial-time algorithms Q, (·)0, (·)1, B and a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm R such that
P [B(Q0, Q1,O(Q0, Q1), R1) = 1 | R1b = 1]
−P [B(η,Q0, Q1,O(Q0, Q1), R1) = 1 | R1b = 0]
is not negligible as a function of η, where Q0 ≡ Q(R1k, R1)0 and Q1 ≡ Q(R1k, R1)1.
(3) There is an algorithm which compromises the IND-CPA security of E by perform-
ing only one query to the oracle.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
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3 Probabilistic reasoning
In this section we present a method for estimating the probability of success of
an attack strategy based on the cryptanalytical knowledge of the attacker. This
knowledge is represented in the form of probabilistic statements which may express
general, abstract properties of cryptographic primitives; our goal is to evaluate the
impact of such properties on the security of the protocol. For this we estimate a
probability distribution of the random variables represented by expressions - that
is, a probability distribution on ΩAη - which veriﬁes all the probabilistic statements
known by the attacker but otherwise reveals as little information and remains as
hard to attack as possible. To assess the impact of properties of the cryptographic
primitives used on the security of a protocol one may then compute the probability
of success of an attacker whose cryptanalytical knowledge contains those properties
using the probability distribution mentioned above. Such an approach may also be
used to analyze the security of a protocol when speciﬁc cryptographic primitives are
used, by using the attacker’s cryptanalytical knowledge to express known properties
of those primitives.
We consider an attacker A with access to a function pA : N×((ExpA×BA)∗)2 →
[0, 1]∪{⊥}, which we use to represent his cryptanalytical knowledge. pA represents
the information available to A in the form of probabilistic statements: that is,
pA[η, (((E1, b1), . . . , (En, bn)), ((E∗,1, b∗1), . . . , (E
∗,n∗ , b∗n∗)))] =
P [E1η = b1, . . . , E
n
η = bn | E∗,1η = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
η = b
∗
n∗ ]
when the attacker’s knowledge allows him to compute this probability, and ⊥ oth-
erwise. In order to model computationally realistic attackers, one may require, for
example, that pA be eﬃciently computable.
We will denote the (ﬁnite) set of probabilistic statements known by the attacker
A (i.e., the statements he can obtain by using the function pA as described above)
for security parameter η by SAη . Henceforth we will describe the knowledge of the
attacker about the cryptographic primitives directly as probabilistic statements,
using the sets SAη instead of the function p
A.
We want to estimate a probability distribution on ΩAη given the set S
A
η (rep-
resenting A’s knowledge about the cryptographic primitives). Exactly what is a
reasonable estimation is diﬃcult to deﬁne, and similar problems have been subject
of extensive research, namely on inductive logic [12,17]. In our approach we use
Shannon’s notion of entropy [24]. Shannon’s entropy is widely used in information
theory as the standard measure for uncertainty about the outcome of a random
experiment, and several information theoretic approaches have been proposed in
the context of information security [4,11,22]. As usual, H(X) denotes the entropy
of a random variable X, and H(X | Y ) denotes the entropy of X conditioned on
another random variable Y .
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given sets ExpAη , B
A
η and S
A
η , we say that D is a distribution of
maximum entropy on ΩAη for S
A
η if the following conditions are veriﬁed:
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• if
(P [E1η = b1, . . . , E
n
η = bn | E∗,1η = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
η = b
∗
n∗ ] = ρ) ∈ SAη ,
then
P [E1 = b1, . . . , En = bn | E∗,1 = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
= b∗n∗ ] = ρ
when E1, . . . , En, E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ← D.
• if D∗ is another distribution which respects the ﬁrst property, and F, F ∗ are
random variables over ΩAη with distribution D,D∗, then H(F ) ≥ H(F ∗).
The following example illustrates the behavior of such a distribution given a few
simple probabilistic statements about two Bernoulli random variables.
Example 3.2 Consider two random variables A,B, each of which has values 0 or
1. We will denote the events A = 1 and A = 0 by A and A¯, respectively, and
adopt similar conventions for B. We will add probabilistic statements to a set S
and analyze the resulting changes in the distribution of maximum entropy D(S)
which veriﬁes the statements in S. We will use e as the base of the logarithms for
the calculus of entropy; the values presented are approximate.
D(S)
S P [A,B] P [A, B¯] P [A¯, B] P [A¯, B¯] H(A,B)
{P [A] = 0.6} 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.366
{P [A] = 0.6,
P [A | B]} = 0.7}
0.336 0.264 0.144 0.256 1.346
{P [A] = 0.6,
P [A | B] = 0.7,
P [B | A] = 0.5}
0.3 0.3 0.128 0.272 1.34
We will now present an important property of the distribution of maximum
entropy which provides a slightly simpler way of computing it and also helps to
justify why it is as a reasonable estimation. The following deﬁnition will be useful.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let s ∈ SAη be the probabilistic statement
P [E1η = b1, . . . , E
n
η = bn | E∗,1η = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
η = b
∗
n∗ ] = ρ,
and let
ΩAη ⊇ F = {f ∈ ΩAη : f(E1) = b1, . . . , f(En) = bn},
ΩAη ⊇ F ∗ = {f ∈ ΩAη : f(E∗,1) = b∗1, . . . , f(E∗,n
∗
) = b∗n∗}.
We will say that the set {P 1s , P 2s , P 3s } is the partition (of ΩAη ) induced by s, where
P 1s = F
∗ \ F , P 2s = F ∩ F ∗, and P 3s = Ωη \ F ∗. Observe that
⋃3
i=1 P
i
s = Ωη and
P is ∩ P js = ∅ for any i = j.
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If SAη = {s1, . . . , sn} is a ﬁnite set of cryptographic properties, we say that
3⋃
i1=1
. . .
3⋃
in=1
{P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn}
is the partition (of ΩAη ) induced by S
A
η .
The next theorem illustrates the importance of this deﬁnition.
Theorem 3.4 Fix a security parameter η. Let SAη = {s1, . . . , sn} be the set of
probabilistic statements known by the attacker for security parameter η, and consider
the partition of ΩAη induced by S
A
η . Suppose that there is a distribution of maximum
entropy D for SAη , and ﬁx (i1, . . . , in) ∈ {1, 2, 3}n. Then, if F is a random element
of ΩAη sampled with probability distribution D ( i.e., F ← D), we have
f1, f2 ∈ P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn ⇒ P [F = f1] = P [F = f2].
This theorem, whose proof can be found in the Appendix, shows that the esti-
mation of maximum entropy D gives the same probability to elements of ΩAη which
A’s knowledge does not distinguish. This is a desirable property, since it indicates
that in some sense D does not give the attacker more information than what he can
infer from his knowledge. Another reason why this theorem is important is that it
provides us with a (slightly) simpler way to compute the distribution D.
Corollary 3.5 Consider the set of cryptographic properties SAη = {s1, . . . , sn}.
Suppose that the function p∗ : {1, 2, 3}n → R is a maximum of
−
3∑
i1=1
. . .
3∑
in=1
|P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn | · p∗(i1, . . . , in) log(p∗(i1, . . . , in)) (2)
restricted to the set of functions p : {1, 2, 3}n → R such that
⎧⎨
⎩
∑3
i1=1
. . .
∑3
in
|P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn | · p(i1, . . . , in) = 1
p(i1, . . . , in) ≥ 0.
.
Then the distribution D deﬁned by F ← D ⇒ P [F = f ] = p(i1, . . . , in), where each
ij is such that f ∈ P ijsj , is a distribution of maximum entropy for SAη .
The problem of maximizing such a function in a set bounded by linear conditions
is well studied in linear programming, and there are eﬃcient algorithms for solving
it [18]. Of course, since the set {(i1, . . . , in) : ij ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j = 1, . . . , n} has size
3n and n may grow as a function of η, this may still not be an eﬃcient way of
estimating the distribution. Indeed, the next result states that computing even one
probability of this distribution is a NP-hard problem in terms of the number of
statements in S. We use the fact that the problem 3SAT is NP-complete [19].
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Theorem 3.6 Let Prob be the following problem: given ﬁnite sets of expressions
Exp, of bitstrings B and of rules S, compute
P [E1 = b1, . . . , En = bn | E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ]
where E1, . . . , En, E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ← D and D is a distribution of maximum entropy
for the sets S, Exp, B.
The problem 3SAT reduces to Prob and the complexity of the reduction is
polynomial in |S|. In particular, Prob is NP-hard (in |S|).
This theorem states that estimating this probability is NP-hard in the number of
cryptographic properties known by the attacker 6 . Despite this fact, it may still be
possible to use this distribution of maximum entropy to estimate the probability of
success of a given attack strategy, even if it involves relatively complex cryptanalysis.
Example 3.7 It is possible to represent in our model an attack to a 6-round version
of DES using the well-known diﬀerential cryptanalysis technique. We are able to
deﬁne a set of algorithms and probabilistic statements about them, and use these
properties to estimate (using the distribution of maximum entropy) that, by en-
crypting 200 pairs of plaintexts, an attacker can guess 30 of the 56 key bits with
probability 0.65. This technique is somewhat involved; we present a simpliﬁed de-
scription of it using our framework in the Appendix. A detailed description of this
attack is given in [28].
For the next theorem we consider a polynomial-time attacker A whose goal
is to obtain the bitstring represented by a certain expression E. We present a
result which may be useful in showing that a certain amount of cryptanalytical
knowledge is not enough for A to have a non-negligible probability of success. The
result concerns the (asymptotic) entropy of (the random variable represented by) E
conditional on the A’s guess, in the distribution of maximum entropy on ΩAη given
SAη . We ﬁrst present an intuitive description of the result. Suppose that A is able
to use the knowledge obtained about messages exchanged in the network, together
with its own knowledge about the cryptographic primitives, to correctly uncover
the bitstring corresponding to the expression E with a non-negligible probability.
We present an attacker A˜ which emulates A, and thus has the same computa-
tional complexity and the same probability of success. However, A˜ may have access
to diﬀerent cryptographic properties and even use diﬀerent algorithms. In particu-
lar, there is an expression g ∈ ExpA˜ which represents A˜’s guess 7 . The result then
states that A˜’s cryptanalytical knowledge is suﬃcient to show that its guess is in a
certain way non-negligibly correlated to the bitstring represented by E. A precise
statement of the result follows. The proof is given in the Appendix.
6 However, this does not necessarily imply that the problem is NP-hard in the security parameter, for it is
possible that the SAη does not grow when we increase the security parameter.
7 Note that this implies that A˜’s guess is completely determined by the random generation algorithms
executed during the protocol either by A˜ or the honest principals.
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Theorem 3.8 Let E ∈ Exp be such that A(Eη) (the set of bitstrings which Eη
may represent for security parameter η) veriﬁes the following:
• given a bitstring b and a security parameter η, there are eﬃcient algorithms for
deciding whether or not b ∈ A(Eη);
• there are N ∈ N, k > 1 satisfying η > N ⇒ |A(Eη)| > kη ( i.e., A(Eη) grows
exponentially in η) 8 .
Suppose that there is a polynomial-time attacker A whose probability of guessing
the bitstring represented by Eη is a non-negligible, computable function of η. Then,
there exists an attacker A˜ and an expression g ∈ ExpA˜ representing A˜’s guess such
that
Hmax(Eη)−H(E | g) (3)
is non-negligible as a function of η, where E, g ← D and D is the distribution of
maximum entropy on ΩA˜η which veriﬁes the all statements in S
A˜
η ( i.e., the set of
cryptanalytical properties known by A˜) and Hmax(Eη) = log |A(Eη)| is the maximum
entropy of a probability distribution on A(Eη).
This theorem may be useful in proving that a given set of known cryptographic
properties SAη are not enough to render a protocol insecure. In fact, suppose that
(3) is negligible for A’s guess g. If that attacker has a non-negligible probability of
success, there must be some other relevant, polynomial-time computable property
which would provide non-negligible information about Eη. If given the sets RA,FA
there is no way to compute a guess g such that (3) is non-negligible, then the
cryptographic properties used by A do not compromise the security of the protocol
by themselves. Of course, when we consider speciﬁc cryptographic primitives, they
may verify other properties which allow an attacker to be successful with non-
negligible probability.
Example 3.9 Our last example uses a version of the Mastermind game, generalized
in our framework as follows. We will use a random generation algorithm c ∈ R such
that c(η) is a random element of {1, . . . , 2η}. For security parameter η, the ﬁrst
player creates a code C ≡ (c1 . . . cη) by executing the random generation algorithm
η times. Another player A (from attacker) tries to guess C by querying the ﬁrst
player with codes Ck ≡ (c1+kη . . . cη+kη). A obtains in return R(C,Ck), given by:
R(C,Ck) = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , η} | cj = cj+kη}.
R(C,Ck) (the number of red balls) represents the number of slots in which Ck has
the same color as the correct code C 9 .
The following cryptographic properties will be used:
P [cj = n | cj+kη = n,R(C,Ck) = 0] = 0, j = 1, . . . , η, (4)
8 Intuitively, this last condition demands that A(Eη) is so large that guessing the bistring corresponding
to Eη is hard.
9 The white balls may be ignored for the purposes of this example.
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P [R(C,Ck) = 0 | c1 = b1, c1+kη = b′1, . . . , cη = bη, cη+kη = b′η] = 1, (5)
for all b1, b′1, . . . , bη, b′η such that b1 = b′1, . . . , bη = b′η.
Consider the following attack strategy. A randomly generates codes Ck and
uses them in its queries. If R(C,Ck) = 0, he discards the information obtained.
Otherwise, he concludes from the equation above that cj = ckη+j for each j (using
(4)). Suppose that A performs 4η log η such queries and hopes to ﬁnd the right
code by excluding, for each slot, all but one possible color (note that this attack has
less than quadratic complexity). We conservatively estimate (see Appendix) the
probability of success to be 1/e, and it is easy to see, by calculations similar to the
ones used in the proof of Theorem 3.8, that this implies a non-negligible decrease
in the entropy of C.
By contrast, suppose that instead of (4), (5) we equip the attacker with property
P [cj = n | cj+kη = n,R(C,Ck) = η] = 1, j = 1, . . . , η. (6)
Note that, in the distribution of maximum entropy, this does not give the attacker
any knowledge about the secret code if R(C,Ck) = η. Consider the following
(natural) attack strategy. The attacker performs a polynomial number of queries,
ηm, and then either returns the correct bitstring (if he found it during those queries)
or some random bitstring otherwise. This guess is correct with at most probability
ηm
(2η)η for some C; all other possible codes have the same probability of being correct.
Again by a process similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 3.8, the entropy
reduction provided by the attacker’s knowledge can then be shown to be a negligible
function η, thus conﬁrming that the property (6) does not compromise the security
of the Masterind “protocol” against this strategy.
4 Conclusion
In this work we presented a formal model for analyzing the security of cryptographic
protocols against attackers who may use cryptanalysis. This model allows the repre-
sentation of cryptanalytical capabilities and partial probabilistic information about
secret messages. It is a very general and ﬂexible model: one may speciﬁy cryp-
tographic properties and use them to describe or ﬁnd an attack, but if one does
not, then it behaves essentially as a symbolic model. For illustration purposes,
we showed how IND-CPA security may be expressed in terms of the probabilistic
statements considered. Finally, we proposed a way of estimating the attacker’s prob-
ability of success. To obtain this estimation we deﬁne the probability distribution
of maximum entropy and present a few properties and examples which justify this
approach. This technique may also be used to study whether or not a weakness of
the cryptographic primitives used compromises the security of a given protocol. An-
other advantage of the approach is that it allows, to some extent, a separate study
of weaknesses of cryptographic primitives and the security of protocols, since one
may simply write properties of the cryptographic primitives deemed relevant and
verify if the protocol is still secure when the attacker explores them. Possible inter-
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esting applications include the study of side-channel attacks, in which the attacker
explores the physical implementation of algorithms to obtain partial information
about secret data (such as a key).
Several problems and open questions remain. First of all, one needs to give
a description of the properties of the cryptographic primitives used, which should
typically be quite hard. Thus, for each cryptographic primitive, ﬁnding a suitable
set of properties to describe its weaknesses is a non-trivial and interesting problem.
Examples of attacks using properties of real cryptographic primitives are typically
hard to manage given the complexity of the computations involved, though im-
plementing the model could help overcome this diﬃculty. Finding an attack has
exponencial complexity on the length of the attack, as is typically the case for most
tools used for this task. Another interesting and relevant problem is to ﬁnd alter-
native methods for estimating probability distributions of bitstrings based on the
knowledge of the attacker. Though the proposal presented here has several advan-
tages and is relatively natural, other methods may be more eﬃcient or reﬂect better
the power and knowledge of the attacker.
As mentioned in the introduction, the work presented here tries to bridge the
gap between the symbolic and computational approaches to the analysis of security
protocols. This is a line of work which has been widely explored since [1]. Diﬀerent
proposals have dealt with this problem from diﬀerent perspectives. In [2], algebraic
properties of the cryptographic functions are included in the model. Several formal
models for analysing guessing attacks have been proposed [21,15], some of which
include probabilistic analysis [3]. Work has also been aimed at the computational
validation of the cryptographic assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model [16], and even
at automatically obtaining or checking cryptographically sound proofs of the secu-
rity of protocols - namely using the CryptoVerif tool [9] and the BPW model [26].
Of course, a thorough comparison of our approach with other proposals in the liter-
ature (both extensions of the Dolev-Yao such as those mentioned above and other
information-theoretic approaches to security such as those presented in [4,11,22])
shall deserve close attention in the near future.
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Appendix
Theorem 2.7 The following are equivalent:
(1) E is not IND-CPA secure.
(2) There exist deterministic polynomial-time algorithms Q, (·)0, (·)1, B and a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm R such that
P [B(Q0, Q1,O(Q0, Q1), R1) = 1 | R1b = 1]
−P [B(η,Q0, Q1,O(Q0, Q1), R1) = 1 | R1b = 0]
(7)
is not negligible as a function of η, where Q0 ≡ Q(R1k, R1)0 and Q1 ≡ Q(R1k, R1)1.
(3) There is an algorithm which compromises the IND-CPA security of E by performing only one query to
the oracle.
Proof. Implication (3)⇒ (1) is trivial. Implication (2)⇒ (3) is also simple.
The proof of (1)⇒ (2) is harder. For simplicity, we will assume ﬁxed a security parameter η and drop
it from the notation when there is no ambiguity. We also abbreviate K ≡ R1k and write Ob to refer to the
oracle O using bit b in the computations, so that Ob(m0,m1) = Enc(η,mb,K,Rie). Let Alg be an algorithm
which compromises the IND-CPA security of E. Observe that, since Alg is a polynomial-time algorithm,
there is a ﬁxed number c such that, for security parameter η, Alg performs at most ηc queries to the oracle.
We may assume, without loss of generality, that Alg always performs exactly ηc queries to the oracle and
that the random choices of the attacker throughout the computation (i.e., the ηc steps) are determined by
a single bitstring R1r sampled from a random generation algorithm Rr.
We may write the ﬁrst pair of plaintexts with which Alg queries the oracle as
(Q(1,K,R1r))
0, (Q(1,K,R1r))
1, where Q, (·)0, (·)1 ∈ FA are functions available to the attacker A.
More generally, for i = 1, . . . , ηc, let
qi = Q(i,K,R
1
r , q
0
1 , q
1
1 , o1, . . . , q
0
i−1, q
1
i−1, oi−1) (8)
represent the pair of messages used in the i-th query to the oracle. Each qi is computable in polynomial-
time: in the worst case, qi needs to emulate the executions of q1, . . . , qi−1 using random data R1r (note
that the output may depend on computations performed by these algorithms). Since i < ηc, this involves
computing at most a polynomial number of algorithms, each of which is computable in polynomial time.
Alg’s response can be represented using an algorithm BF as follows:
BF (η,K,R
1
r , q
0
1 , q
1
1 , o1, . . . , q
0
ηc , q
1
ηc , oηc ). (9)
Since Q, BF are polynomial-time algorithms, we may assume, without loss of generality, that they are
total: if they are not, we may specify some predetermined result and stipulate that they will return that
result if they do not return another answer after a certain polynomial number of operations.
Now suppose that, instead of using the same bit R1b in all queries, the oracle O uses the bit bi in the
i-th query (in other words, in the i-th query Alg is querying Obi ). Let δi≥j = 1 if i ≥ j and 0 otherwise.
Note that
P [Alg(η,K) = 1 | bi = 1]− P [Alg(η,K) = 1 | bi = 0] (10)
=
ηcX
j=1
(P [Alg(η,K) = 1 | bi = δi≥j ]− P [Alg(η,K) = 1 | bi = δi≥j+1]),
because the sum on the right-hand side is telescopic. The left-hand side is non-negligible by hypothesis, and
thus so is the right hand side. The assumption that Q,BF return an answer in polynomial time for every
possible input is necessary here, since we are running these algorithms with inputs that would be impossible
in the original setting.
Querying the oracle Ob with q0, q1 is the same as computing Enc(η, qb,K,Re(η)). Thus, if in some step
of the algorithm Alg, instead of querying the oracle Ob with plaintexts q0i , q1i , we encrypt qbi with public
key k and random data ri ← Re(η), the probability distribution of the output does not change.
Consider the following modiﬁed version Alg′ of the algorithm Alg. For each η, Alg′ receives an additional
argument j ∈ {1, . . . , ηc}. Alg′ mimics the execution of Alg, except for the following. In the ﬁrst j − 1
queries, Alg′ computes an encryption of the ﬁrst message of the pair (instead of querying the oracle O) and
uses that result in the following computations. In the j-th query, Alg′ queries the oracle just as Alg would;
after the j-th query, Alg′ computes encryptions of the second message of the pair instead of querying the
oracle.
It is easy to see that
P [Alg′(η, k, j) = 1 | b = 1]− P [Alg′(η, k, j) = 1 | b = 0]
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= P [Alg(η, k) = 1 | bi = δi≥j ]− P [Alg(η, k) = 1 | bi = δi≥j+1].
Suppose now that Alg′′ is an algorithm which chooses j = 1, . . . , ηc randomly (with uniform distribu-
tion) and then executes Alg′(η, k, j). We obtain:
P [Alg′′(η, k) = 1 | b = 1]− P [Alg′′(η, k) = 1 | b = 0]
=
ηcX
l=1
P [j = l] · (P [Alg′(η, k, l) = 1 | b = 1]− P [Alg′(η, k, l) = 1 | b = 0])
=
1
ηc
ηcX
j=1
(P [Alg(η, k) = 1 | bi = δi≥j ]− P [Alg(η, k) = 1 | bi = δi≥j+1])
=
1
ηc
(P [Alg(η, k) = 1 | b = 1]− P [Alg(η, k) = 1 | b = 0]).
Thus, by (10) and the equalities above, we conclude that
P [Alg′′(η, k) = 1 | b = 1]− P [Alg′′(η, k) = 1 | b = 0]
is non-negligible.
It is clear that Alg′′ is a polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, Alg′′ involves only one query to
the oracle, compromises the IND-CPA security of E, and it is easy to see that Alg′′ may be written in
terms of algorithms Q, (·)0, (·)1, B,R as desired: R(η) returns the random generated data Rr, the random
j ∈ {1, . . . , ηc} used by Alg′′ and the random data used in the encryptions R1e, . . . , Rη
c
e , Q generates the
pairs of plaintexts with which Alg′′ queries the oracle and B computes the ﬁnal answer. This concludes the
demonstration. 
Theorem 3.4 Fix a security parameter η. Let SAη = {s1, . . . , sn} be the set of probabilistic statements
known by the attacker for security parameter η, and consider the partition of ΩAη induced by S
A
η . Suppose
that there is a distribution of maximum entropy D for SAη , and ﬁx (i1, . . . , in) ∈ {1, 2, 3}n. Then, if F is
a random element of ΩAη sampled with probability distribution D ( i.e., F ← D), we have
f1, f2 ∈ P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn ⇒ P [F = f1] = P [F = f2]. (11)
Proof. For each s ∈ SAη and each f ∈ ΩAη , we write i(s, f) for the number i ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that f ∈ P i(s,f)r .
We will consider an arbitrary distribution D which veriﬁes all properties in SAη and obtain another
distribution D′. We will then show that properties in SAη still hold for D′, which veriﬁes (11) and has
greater entropy than D.
Let F ← D, F ′ ← D′. We deﬁne the distribution D′ by
P [F ′ = f ] =
P [F ∈ P i(s1,x)s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P i(sn,x)sn ]
|P i(s1,x)s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P i(sn,x)sn |
.
It is clear that D′ veriﬁes (11). To see that D′ veriﬁes all properties in SAη , let
sj = (P [E
1
η = b1, . . . , E
n
η = bn | E∗,1η = b∗1, . . . , E∗,n
∗
η = b
∗
n∗ ] = ρ) ∈ SAη .
Now, if F ′ ← D′, we have
P [F ′ ∈ P 2sj | F ′ ∈ P 1sj ∪ P 2sj ] =
P [F ′ ∈ P 2sj ]
P [F ′ ∈ P 1sj ∪ P 2sj ]
.
For each sequence (i1, . . . , in) ∈ {1, 2, 3}n, it is clear that P [F ′ ∈ P i1s1∩. . .∩P insn ] = P [F ∈ P i1s1∩. . .∩P insn ].
From this, by setting ij = 2 and summing over all other ik, we conclude that P [F
′ ∈ P 2sj ] = P [F ∈ P 2sj ],
and thus
P [F ′(E1) = b1, . . . , F ′(En) = bn | F ′(E∗,1) = b∗1, . . . , F ′(E∗,n
∗
) = b∗n∗ ]
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= P [F (E1) = b1, . . . , F (E
n) = bn | F (E∗,1) = b∗1, . . . , F (E∗,n
∗
) = b∗n∗ ].
Since we know that D veriﬁes properties SAη , we conclude that D′ does too.
We now check that H(F ′) ≥ H(F ). From Jensen’s inequality for convex functions, we know that
nX
i=1
xi = k ⇒ −
nX
i=1
xi log xi ≤ k log n
k
.
Thus, for each sequence (i1, . . . , in) ∈ {1, 2, 3}n, we obtain
−
X
f∈P i1s1∩...∩P
in
sn
P [F = f ] · logP [F = f ]
≤ P [F ∈ P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn ] · log
|P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn |
P [X ∈ P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn ]
=
X
f∈P i1s1∩...∩P
in
sn
P [F ∈ P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn ]
|P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn |
· log |P
i1
s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn |
P [F ∈ P i1s1 ∩ . . . ∩ P insn ]
= −
X
f∈P i1s1∩...∩P
in
sn
P [F ′ = f ] · logP [F ′ = f ].
Using the inequality above, the desired result comes from
H(F ′) = −
X
i1,...,in
X
f∈P i1s1∩...∩P
in
sn
P [F ′ = f ] · logP [F ′ = f ]
≥ −
X
i1,...,in
X
f∈P i1s1∩...∩P
in
sn
(P [F = f ] · logP [F = f ] = H(F ).

Theorem 3.6 Let Prob be the following problem: given ﬁnite sets of expressions Exp, of bitstrings B
and of rules S, compute
P [E1 = b1, . . . , E
n = bn | E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n∗ ]
where E1, . . . , En, E∗,1, . . . , E∗,n
∗ ← D and D is a distribution of maximum entropy for the sets S, Exp,
B.
The problem 3SAT reduces to Prob and the complexity of the reduction is polynomial in |S|. In
particular, Prob is NP-hard (in |S|).
Proof. We prove that, given an algorithm for deciding in polynomial-time (in |S|) whether a certain
probability is 0 or 1, one may obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the problem 3SAT. Let
ϕ = (l11 ∨ l12 ∨ l13) ∧ . . . ∧ (ln1 ∨ ln2 ∨ ln3)
be an instance of the problem 3SAT (i.e., a propositional formula consisting of a conjunction of disjunctions
of three literals). Denote by S(ϕ) = {s1, . . . , sk} the set of propositional symbols present in ϕ.
We will set B = {0, 1}, Exp = {s1, . . . , sk, c1, . . . , cn, ϕ}. Intuitively, the expression si represents the
truth value of the propositional symbol si, ci represents the truth value of the i-th clause ci = (li1∨li2∨li3),
and ϕ represents the truth value of the formula ϕ = c1 ∧ . . .∧ cn. For each i = 1, . . . , n and each j = 1, 2, 3,
let sij ∈ S(ϕ) be such that either lij = sij or lij = ¬sij . Furthermore, let bij = 1 if lij = sij and 0 if
lij = ¬sij .
The set of rules S describes how the value of each expression ci may be computed from the expressions
s1, . . . , sk and how ϕ may be computed from ci, i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, S contains the properties:
P [ci = 1 | sij = bij ] = 1, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
P [ci = 0 | si1 = 1− bij for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}] = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(12)
and
P [ϕ = 0 | ci = 0] = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
P [ϕ = 1 | c1 = 1, . . . , cn = 1].
(13)
B. Montalto, C. Caleiro / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 253 (2009) 143–165160
It is clear that the original instance of 3SAT may be polynomially converted in this instance of Prob.
Thus, we need only show that
ϕ is satisﬁable ⇐⇒ P [ϕ = 1] > 0 in D(S), (14)
where D(S) is the distribution of maximum entropy which veriﬁes all probabilistic statements in S. In order
to do this, we ﬁrst note that each f ∈ Ω determines an assignment which attributes “true” to si if f(si) = 1
and “false” otherwise.
Let F be a random varible taking values in Ω, and let FS = (F (s1), . . . , F (sk)), FC,ϕ =
(F (c1), . . . , F (cn), F (ϕ)), so that F is determind by (FS , fC,ϕ). It is clear from equations (12), (13) that if
F veriﬁes all probabilistic statements in S then FC,ϕ is determined by FS . Thus, we have H(F ) = H(FS),
and it becomes clear that FS has uniform probability distribution (when considering the distribution of
maximum entropy D(S) on Ω).
(14) is now clear: if ϕ is satisﬁable, then there is at least one assignment which satisﬁes it, and if f is
such that fS = (f(s1), . . . , f(sn)) is the value of FS which induces that assignment, then f(ϕ) = 1 and
P [ϕ = 1] ≥ P [FS = fS ] = 1/2k > 0.
On the other hand, if ϕ is not satisﬁable, then for all f we have P [ϕ = 1, FS = fS ] = 0, and hence
P [ϕ = 1] = 0. 
Example 3.7 (Cryptanalysis of DES) In this example we show that it is possible to represent in our
model an attack to a 6-round version of DES using the well-known diﬀerential cryptanalysis technique. We
refer the reader to [28] for a detailed description of the DES encryption scheme and this cryptanalysis
technique. For simplicity, we will ignore the security parameter during this description.
We will use the following algorithms. Again for simplicity, instead of describing all the algorithms
themselves, we deﬁne abbreviations representing the expressions in ExpA which we will use.
• K ∈ R is the key generation algorithm. We will assume throughout this example that K1 represents the
key being used in the encryption (which the attacker wants to uncover);
• b,b’ are two speciﬁc bitstrings which the attacker will use in the construction of pairs of plaintexts;
• Lm(b), L∗,m(b) (resp. Rm(b), R∗,m(b)) represent two randomly generated 32-bits bitstrings whose x-or
is the bitstring b. We write Pm = Lm(b)Rm(b’), P ∗,m = L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’) to represent the pair of
plaintexts obtained from the m-th execution of these algorithms.
• ⊕ ∈ F computes the x-or of two bitstrings. We will use inﬁx notation for ⊕;
• For each i = 1, . . . , 6 and each j = 1, . . . , 8, ISi,j(P,K) (resp. OSi,j(P,K)) represents bitstrings used
during the computation of the encryption of a plaintext P ; K1i,j represents six key bits used in a certain
step of the encryption;
• Lm3 , E
m
3 , E
m
O,j , E
m
I,j , E
∗,m
I,j ∈ ExpA are certain expressions needed in the cryptanalysis procedure which
depend on the input plaintexts Pm, P ∗,m and the corresponding ciphertexts. As such, the attacker can
compute the bitstring corresponding to these expressions.
• For each j = 1, . . . , 8, and each b, b′ ∈ Z62, c ∈ Z42, testj(b, b′, c) represents a set of 6-bit bitstrings.
• For each j, b, b′, c as described above and each k ∈ Z62, contains(testj(b, b′, c), k) is 1 if k belongs to the
set represented by testj(b, b
′, c) and 0 otherwise.
• For (j1, . . . , j5) = (2, 5, 6, 7, 8), ﬁlters(EmI,j1 , E
∗,m
I,j1
, EmO,j1 , . . . , E
m
I,j5
, E∗,mI,j5 , E
m
O,j5
) is either 0 or 1.
The main cryptographic properties which we will need are the following:
P [Lm3 = b | Em3 = b] =
1
16
, for b ∈ Z62; (15)
P [OS6,j(L
m(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
)⊕OS6,j(L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),Km
′
) = EmO,j
| Lm3 = b, Em3 = b] = 1 for j ∈ {2, 5, 6, 7, 8};
(16)
P [IS6,j(L
m(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
) = b | EmI,j = b] = 1; (17)
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P [IS6,j(L
∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),Km
′
) = b | E∗,mI,j = b] = 1 (18)
(note that the attacker cannot compute IS6,j(L
m(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
) directly, as it depends on the unknown
key Km
′
);
P [contains(testj(ISj,k(L
m(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
),
ISj,k(L
∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),Km
′
), bO),K
m′
i,j )
| OS6,k(Lm(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
)⊕OS6,k(L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),Km
′
) = bO] = 1;
(19)
P [contains(testj(ISj,k(L
m(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
),
ISj,k(L
∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),Km
′
), c), k] =
1
16
,
(20)
where c ∈ Z42, k ∈ Z62 and we assume that either c is diﬀerent from the bitstring represented by
OS6,k(L
m(b)Rm(b’),Km
′
)⊕OS6,k(L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),Km′ ) or k is diﬀerent from the bitstring represented
by Km
′
i,j
10 ;
P [ﬁlters(EmI,j1 , E
∗,m
I,j1
, EmO,j1 , . . . , E
m
I,j5
, E∗,mI,j5 , E
m
O,j5
) = 1
| Lm3 = b, Em3 = b] = 1
(21)
and
P [ﬁlters(EmI,j1 , E
∗,m
I,j1
, EmO,j1 , . . . , E
m
I,j5
, E∗,mI,j5 , E
m
O,j5
) = 0
| Lm3 = b′, Em3 = b] = 5/8, b = b′.
(22)
We will tacitly assume that the attacker knows probabilistic statements which imply that if one replaces a
subexpression s of an expression E by another subexpression s′ which represents the same bitstring then
the bitstring represented by E does not change. For the sake of brevity, we omit such details here.
We now describe the strategy of the attacker. The attacker generates pairs of plaintexts
Pm = Lm(b)Rm(b’), P ∗,m = L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’). From these plaintexts and corresponding cipher-
texts, he computes Em0,j , E
m
I,j , E
∗,m
I,j for j = 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and uses the results to compute ﬁlters
m ≡
ﬁlters(EmI,j1 , E
∗,m
I,j1
, EmO,j1 , . . . , E
m
I,j5
, E∗,mI,j5 , E
m
O,j5
). If the computation returns 0 for a certain m, the at-
tacker disregards the pair of plaintexts Pm, P ∗,m.
Now, according to (15), P [Em3 = L
m
3 ] = 1/16; by (21), if this is the case, then ﬁlters
m = 1. From (22),
we also conclude that P [ﬁltersm = 1] = 3/8. Thus, the attacker discards 5/8 of the pairs of plaintexts; of
the remaining 3/8, 1/6 of them correspond to pairs Pm, P ∗,m such that Lm3 = E
m
3 . These are the plaintexts
which the attacker will use to gain information about the secret key.
From (16) and the previous reasoning, we conclude that
P [OS6,j(L
m(b)Rm(b’),K1)⊕OS6,j(L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),K1) = EmO,j
| ﬁltersm = 1] = 1
6
.
(23)
(17) and (18) tell us that
EmI,j = IS6,j(L
m(b)Rm(b’),K1),
E∗,mI,j = IS6,j(L
∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),K1).
The attacker then computes contains(testj(E
m
I,j , E
∗,m
I,j , E
m
O,j), k) for all j = 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and all k ∈ Z62.
Now, if
EmO,j = OS6,j(L
m(b)Rm(b’),K1)⊕OS6,j(L∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),K1), (24)
which happens with probability 1/6, we have
containsmj (k) ≡ contains(testj(EmI,j , E∗,mI,j , EmO,j), k) =
contains(testj(ISj,k(L
m(b)Rm(b’),K1)
10This property is an estimation rather than a precise value; using a more complete set of cryptographic
properties, it is obtained in the distribution of maximum entropy from other properties of the encryption
process.
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and
ISj,k(L
∗,m(b)R∗,m(b’),K1), bO), k).
Thus, by (19), containsmj (K
1
6,j) = 1. If k = K16,j is some other bitstring, P [containsmj (k) = 1] = 1/16
and P [containsmj (k) = 0] = 15/16. If (24) is not veriﬁed, which happens with probability 5/6, we have
P [containsmj (k) = 1] = 1/16 with probability 1/16 for all k ∈ Z62.
It is easy to see that in the distribution of maximum entropy:
• the results of containsmj (k) and contains
m
j′ (k) are independent for j = j′;
• the results of containsmj (k) and contains
m
j (k
′) are independent for k = k′;
• the results of containsmj (k) and contains
m′
j (k) are independent for m = m′.
The attacker will try to guess the bits K16,j for j = 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, thus obtaining 30 of the 56 bits of
the original key. Suppose that the attacker encrypts N = 200 pairs of plaintexts. We may estimate
his probability of success as follows. The expected number of “ﬁltered” pairs if 3N/8 = 75. For each
j = 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and each ﬁltered pair of plaintexts, we have P [containsmj (k) = 1] = 1/6 + 5/6 · 1/16 = 7/32
if k = K16,j and P [contains
m
j (k) = 1] = 1/16 if k = K16,j .
Fix j ∈ {2, 5, 6, 7, 8}, K16,j = k ∈ Z62, and recall that in the distribution of maximum entropy the results
of containsmj are independent for diﬀerent values of m. Taking this fact and the previous estimations
into account, we conclude that the probability that after 75 ﬁltered tests there are more positive results
containsmj (k) than contains
m
j (K
1
6,j) is given by
p =
75X
i=1
(
“75
i
”
(
7
32
)i(
1
16
)75−i
75X
j=i+1
“75
j
”
(
1
16
)j(
15
16
)75−j) ≈ 0.0013. (25)
Thus, the probability that some bitstring K16,j = k ∈ Z62 has more positive results than K16,j can be
estimated to be less than 63p ≈ 0.082. As such, the probability that, for all j = 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, the bitstring
with more positive results containsmj (k) is the one represented by K
1
6,j is at least (1− 63p)5 ≈ 0.65. 
Theorem 3.8 Let E ∈ Exp be such that A(Eη) (the set of bitstrings which Eη may represent for security
parameter η) veriﬁes the following:
• given a bitstring b and a security parameter η, there are eﬃcient algorithms for deciding whether or not
b ∈ A(Eη);
• there are N ∈ N, k > 1 satisfying η > N ⇒ |A(Eη)| > kη ( i.e., A(Eη) grows exponentially in η) 11 .
Suppose that there is a polynomial-time attacker A whose probability of guessing the bitstring rep-
resented by Eη is a non-negligible, computable function of η. Then, there exists an attacker A˜ and an
expression g ∈ ExpA˜ representing A˜’s guess such that
Hmax(Eη)−H(E | g) (26)
is non-negligible as a function of η, where E, g ← D and D is the distribution of maximum entropy on
ΩA˜η which veriﬁes the all statements in S
A˜
η ( i.e., the set of cryptanalytical properties known by A˜) and
Hmax(Eη) = log |A(Eη)| is the maximum entropy of a probability distribution on A(Eη).
Proof. The ﬁrst step of the proof is to see that we may specify an attacker A˜ with the two properties
described above.
For this, suppose that, whenever the attacker A would make a probabilistic decision, A˜ runs some
random generation algorithm R ∈ RA˜ and records its result. He then makes his choice deterministically, as
determined by the output of the random generation algorithm. Clearly, we may assume that the probability
of each decision is the same for both attackers, A and A˜, and so their probability of success is also the same.
Since all of A˜’s probabilistic decisions and computations are represented by the results of random
generation algorithms in RA˜, it is clear that we may write A˜’s guess as an expression g ∈ ExpA˜ which
depends on the outputs of random generation algorithms executed during the protocol (either by the attacker
or other users of the network). Since A˜ is a polynomial-time adversary, each random generation algorithm
11 Intuitively, this last condition demands that A(Eη) is so large that guessing the bistring corresponding
to Eη is hard.
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cannot be executed more than a polynomial number of times, and it is easy to see that g can be computed
in polynomial-time by simulating an execution of the attack (recall that all probabilistic decisions and
randomly generated data are determined by the random generation algorithms).
Let s be the non-negligible, computable function such that s(η) is the probability that the attacker
correctly guesses the bitstring corresponding to Eη . A˜’s cryptanalytical knowledge contains the properties
P [(Equals(E, g))η = 1] = s(η)
for each ﬁxed security parameter η, where Equals ∈ FA˜ is an algorithm which receives two bitstrings and
returns 1 if they are equal, 0 otherwise. This property states that the probability that the guess of the
attacker is correct is given by s(η), and thus is correct by hypothesis. Furthermore, we let the attacker
know that the value of E is in A(Eη): i.e., we deﬁne e ∈ FA˜ so that e(η, b) = 1 if b ∈ A(η) and 0 otherwise,
and consider the properties
P [E = b | e(b) = 0] = 0,
P [e(E) = e(b) | E = b] = 1
for all E ∈ ExpA˜η . We also need some properties of Equals to prove our result:
P [E′ = b | E = b,Equals(E,E′) = 1] = 1,
P [E′ = b | E = b,Equals(E,E′) = 0] = 0,
where E,E′ ∈ ExpA˜η , b ∈ BA˜η .
These properties imply that
P [E = b | g = b] = s(η),
P [E = b | e(b) = 0] = 0
when E is sampled from the distribution of maximum entropy given A˜’s cryptanalytical knowledge; the
second property is valid for all b ∈ BA˜η .
Without any further knowledge of E, it follows that, in the distribution of maximum entropy,
P [E = b | Equals(g, b) = 0, e(b) = 1] = 1− s(η)|A(Eη)| − 1
for b ∈ BA˜η .
Thus,
H(E | g) = −s(η) log(s(η))− (1− s(η)) log 1− s(η)|A(Eη)| − 1
< − 1
ηc
log
1
ηc
− (1− 1
ηc
) log
1− 1
ηc
|A(Eη)| − 1
,
for suﬃciently large η and some c > 0. By deﬁnition of Hmax,
Hmax(Eη) = log(|A(Eη)|).
Now
Hmax(Eη)−H(E | g) ≥ log(|A(Eη)|) + 1
ηc
log
1
ηc
+ (1− 1
ηc
) log
1− 1
ηc
|A(Eη)| − 1
= log(|A(Eη)|) + 1
ηc
log
1
ηc
+ (1− 1
ηc
) log(1− 1
ηc
)− (1− 1
ηc
) log(|A(Eη)| − 1)
= [log(|A(Eη)|)− log(|A(Eη)| − 1)] + 1
ηc
log
1
ηc
+ (1− 1
ηc
) log(1− 1
ηc
) +
1
ηc
log(|A(Eη)| − 1).
(27)
Dividing each of these parcels by ηc−1 and using properties of logarithms, one obtains that
Hmax(Eη)−H(Eη | gη)
ηc−1
> C′
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for some constant C′ and all suﬃciently large η, which concludes the proof. 
Example 3.9 (Probability of Success) It is clear that the probability distribution of c(η) is uniform in
the set {1, . . . , 2η} (considering the distribution of maximu entropy), and that diﬀerent executions of c are
independent (i.e., cm, cm
′
are independent for m = m′). It is also easy to see that the responses R(C,Ck)
are independent for diﬀerent values of k. From the ﬁrst consideration one may conclude that P [cm = cm
′
] =
1/(2η) for m = m′. Equations (4), (5) imply that R(C,Ck) = 0 iﬀ cj = cj+kη for j = 1, . . . , η. Thus, we
obtain P [R(C,Ck) = 0] = ( 2η−1
2η
)η → 1√
e
.
After 4η log η queries, we expect that approximately N = 4√
e
η log η of them, say k1, . . . , kN , are
“relevant” (i.e., A’s response, R(C,Cki ), is 0). Let us then estimate the probability that I can obtain the
correct bitstring from this number of relevant queries. Consider the set S1 of the bitstrings represented by
c1+k1η , . . . , c1+kNη . If #S1 = 2η − 1, then the information available to the attacker allows to exclude all
but one hypothesis for the value of c1 (by equation (4)). The probability of this event is at least
(2η)Bη log η − (2η − 1)Bη log η
(2η)Bη log η
= 1− (1− 1/2
η
)Bη log η → 1− 1
η2/
√
e
,
where B = 4√
e
.
Since all executions of c are independent, it is easy to conclude that the same calculation can be made
for all other “slots” 1 through η. Thus, the probability that the attacker is able to obtain the correct “color”
for all slots can be estimated to be
(1− 1
η2/
√
e
)η > (1− 1
η
)η → 1
e
.

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